The case studies examined demonstrate three trends which reveal a masculine logic from which GE is exploited as a tool, preventing meaningful advancement towards its rhetorical goal. First, many groups unconsciously reproduce traditional gender binaries by devaluing the feminine and masculinizing female insurgents. GE is then framed as a secondary issue which is contingent on achieving the primary goal, a logical fallacy which failed to address the necessary structural changes. Finally, many insurgencies exploit gender norms opportunistically for tactical purposes, facilitating their reproduction and preventing reform.

MASCULINIZATION OF FEMALE

Masculinization of female insurgents and devaluation of the feminine occur in two primary ways. First, women tend to be afforded respect only when proving themselves to a masculine standard. This is a strong recurring theme of the LTTE, which expects its female combatants to emulate the same qualities of fierceness as their male counterparts [57]. In pointing to an important relational trend, Alison notes that “equality here is arguably about women emulating constructed/expected masculine qualities.”, rather than an equal exchange of male and female qualities [58]. A similar theme is found in the PKK, which prior to creating female cadres kept women separate from the men, disallowing them from using the same campfires, wearing their hair down, or exposing indications of their femininity (menstrual pads, for example) [59]. Even as the PKK affords increasing respect towards its female combatants, some women masculinize their bodies through chest binding to present themselves as more authoritative [60]. The gender divide still appears clearest during wartime, when male guerillas, distrustful of their female comrades’ abilities, may prevent women from fighting on the frontline under the pretext of protection [61]. Male insurgents also criticise females for their perceived emotions or physical strength, and women are often suspected of being spies of the Turkish state [62]. In Nepal, women who fill non-combatant political roles tend enjoy less mobility and respect than combatant women [63], suggesting that the rejection of femininity through combat earns them comparatively more opportunity. This is exemplified through the fact that negotiation parties in the political (non-combatant) realm repeatedly appoint men as representatives of women in the movement [64].

The Cuban and Nicaraguan “tough but tender” revolutionary may be read as a challenge to feminine devaluation, but in fact represents a very controlled acceptance of the feminine. The Nicaraguan “new man” was only afforded feminine traits to a point. The “wrong” balance of tenderness versus toughness was often portrayed in caricatures of gay men [65], who represented a “failed, effeminate masculinity” [66]. It is noted that the call in the 1980s for all Cubans to take up arms, “…can be read as a masculinist refusal of the feminine position of surrender and dependence. Here, all Cubans—men, women, and children—were expected to defend Cuba’s independence and, in a sense, Cuba’s manhood. Arguably, then, death before dependency, stated differently, is death before feminization” [67].

Feminine devaluation is secondly expressed through narratives of the “violent woman”, which depict women as vicious and hyper-violent actors, often explained as the result of sexual deviance or emotional disturbance [68]. In committing violence, women transgress doubly, first through the violent act, and secondly by defying the stereotypes which would seemingly reject such an act [69]. Violent woman narratives are noted in both the Indian Maoists and the LTTE. Indian historical narratives of ruthless female warriors do exist, but the honour afforded to these fictional women was not also given to violent Maoist women, who are often shunned by society [70]. This was also the case in the LTTE, one explanation being that in order to be taken seriously as combatants, women must be doubly ruthless as men [71]. Though it may afford female combatants legitimacy in combat, this narrative does not effectively advance GE. The explanations for such actions undermine the political agency of these women [72], thus removing both their political contributions as well as obscuring their regular femininities.

Both trends imply a masculinized foundation of these insurgencies, which demands that women make the effort to meet a masculine ideal, rather than accepting the female gender in previously masculine spaces. Acceptance of the female only on the condition that they reject their femininity is, indeed, not gender equality at all, but the continuation of patriarchal structures.

GENDER EQUALITY AS A PROXY GOAL

In most cases, GE appears to have been positioned as dependent on the primary goal’s accomplishment, a tactic which Alison considers to be a “classic trap” [73] in insurgencies. This trap appears to be present in Sri Lanka [74], India [75], Nepal [76], and Cuba [77], which all appeared to take the stance that gender inequalities would melt away once national reform was achieved. The PKK may be considered one exception to this. Female emancipation was initially overshadowed by revolutionary needs [78], but the subsequent adoption of Jineology has reversed the proxy relationship: national liberation is now tied to women’s emancipation, rather than the opposite [79].

Treating GE as a proxy goal serves the strategic purpose of devaluing its urgency. Insurgents who are invested in the achievement of GE will not find themselves distracted from the primary goal if it is believed that the two goals are achieved simultaneously. Further, this strategy absolves the insurgency of addressing gender inequality directly, spinning the narrative instead that changes in regime will also reconstruct fundamental structural relations. This is a logical fallacy, however, as the highly gendered (and highly structured) environments of insurgencies resist the introduction of non-masculine genders or the reconfiguration of social relationships. Rather than an insidious trap for the recruitment of women, this narrative indicates a misunderstanding of the fundamental role that gender plays, and the structural reform needed to alter its composition.

GENDER AS A WEAPON OF WAR

Too fundamental a social structure to be “muted” during conflict [80], gender experiences both restructuring and exploitation in the cases examined [81]. A common form of restructuring is the strict control of romantic or sexual relationships. The PKK scorns sexual relationships, advocating instead for (platonic) love, directed only towards the Kurdish people, the revolution, and Öcalan himself [82]. This control is targeted primarily towards women, who are thought to carry familial honour which is easily susceptible to betrayal [83]. A similar system is found among the ranks of the LTTE, which encouraged “sibling” relationships and imposed severe restrictions on romance [84]. In a different approach, the Nepalese Maoists have used forced marriage as a tactic to retain women within the party [85]. Traditional gender roles may also be exploited for propaganda or attack purposes. The PKK has been cited as intentionally using women and children as victims of the Turkish state’s repression to frame the state as ruthless despots [86], while the LTTE is credited with perfecting bomb belts that create the illusion of pregnancy on its wearer [87]. Both tactics exploit gendered ideas that women are non-violent, and elicit greater sympathy from targeted audiences or promote ease of access to a target.

Beyond attack purposes, insurgencies may also control gender in response to COIN tactics. COIN operations may use sexual abuse as a war tactic [88], and may also advance gendered narratives for delegitimization purposes. Popular narratives in Indian COIN often reduce female insurgents to the “girlfriends” of the men, stripping them of agency and political voice [89]. A similar tactic is used by the Turkish state, which paints the PKK as an army of hyper-masculine, primitive men accompanied by their sexually deviant female sex slaves [90]. This depiction reduces the PKK to an uncivilized group rather than a legitimate insurgency. The tight control of sexual and gendered relationships within insurgency groups may in part be a response to gender-based COIN tactics. By controlling gender relationships, the insurgency both exhibits a unique social structure which distances itself from the “old” society it seeks to overcome, while also protecting itself against harmful delegitimizing gender-based narratives.